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Women’s Testimony and 
Talmudic Reasoning
Deena Kopyto
Introduction
Today, being a witness is often considered a burden – an obligation that 
courts force people to fulfill. In contrast, in Talmudic-era Babylonia and 
ancient Israel, testifying was a privilege that certain groups, including slaves, 
women, and children, did not enjoy. While minors should be barred from 
participating in courts, and still largely are today, the status of women in 
Talmudic courts poses a much trickier question. 
Through this historical and Talmudic analysis, I aim to determine the 
root of this ban. The reasons for the ineligibility of female testimony range 
far and wide, but most are not explicitly mentioned in the Talmud. Perhaps 
women in Talmudic times were infrequently called as witnesses, and rabbis 
banned women from participation in courts in order to further crystallize this 
patriarchal structure. By contrast, perhaps women had previously participated 
as witnesses in courts, but stopped being called to testify once the rabbis 
enacted this decree. Another option is that this was the Jewish tradition since 
Sinai, and women were never allowed to be witnesses in the Jewish court 
system; the rabbis did not create this law, they just solidified a tradition. 
Through each option, the context of the societies in which these laws were 
formed cannot be ignored. In this paper, we will focus on whether this ban 
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really is rooted in biblical texts, or if it was artificially grafted by rabbinic 
enactments. 
Biblical Origins
One of the main questions about the disqualification of women’s 
testimony is whether this is a rabbinic enactment, or if a biblical source exists. 
Other societies existing in the biblical era had mixed positions on women 
bearing witness, with Athenian texts suggesting women could not, and 
the Assyrian position being less clear. Nowhere in the Bible are women, or 
other groups who are rabbinically excluded from giving testimony, explicitly 
mentioned in connection to testimony. In Deuteronomy 19:15, the verse 
states “According to two witnesses or according to three witnesses, matters 
shall be established.” While one scholar, Yair Shiber, claims that women 
were not excluded from testifying because both parents of the rebellious 
son can be witnesses to his immoral behavior, most experts agree that this 
was an exception rather than a rule. This lack of Biblical proof suggests this 
enactment was created by the rabbis. However, some Mishnaic and Amoraic 
sources attempt to prove that this law is biblically sourced, and use various 
methods, such as gezera shava (verbal analogy) to support their stance. 
Tannaitic Origins
The Mishnah explicitly mentions women in court in Tractate Shevuot 4:1
An oath of evidence applies to men but not to women, to those who 
are not near of kin but not to such as are kinsfolk, to those who are 
eligible but not to those who are not qualified. And it applies only to 
such as are fit to give evidence.
The Mishnah does not consider it necessary to provide proof for this 
statement, but states it as a fact in a conversation about oaths and court 
proceedings. That there is explanation offered in support of this statement, 
affirms the argument that women already were ineligible to testify. The 
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apparent shift could have been the product of societal influences. Other 
ancient societies, such as Assyrian, Greek, and Roman laws put restrictions on 
women witnesses, and Jews in the Mishnaic adopted this practice.
This Mishnah is particularly interesting in that it explicitly mentions 
women, instead of grouping them with people who are “not qualified”. This 
indicates that the rabbis felt it necessary to clearly mention that women’s 
testimonies were not accepted, which suggests that these testimonies may 
once have been permitted. Later we see that in some cases, the testimony of 
a woman was admissible, so this Mishnah makes clear that Jews know these 
cases are the exception and not the rule. From here we see that the rabbis 
wanted to cement this practice of excluding women’s testimony. The following 
verse from the Amoraim Mishnah greatly influenced women and courts 
throughout Jewish history. 
In tractate Rosh Hashanah 1:8, the Mishnah states,
These are considered unfit (witnesses): gamblers with dice, those that 
lend interest, pigeon racers, those who trade in the produce of the 
sabbatical year, and slaves. This the general principle: all evidence that 
a woman is not eligible to give, these (people mentioned above) also 
are not eligible to bring. 
This mishnah implies that there are cases in which a woman can bring 
testimony and some in which she cannot. However, the mishnah in Shevuot 
implies that a woman’s testimony is always inadmissible. This may reflect 
a shift in the perspective of the rabbis, and support the case that the rabbis 
slowly limited the cases in which women could testify until there were almost 
none left. Eventually they decreed in Shevuot that a woman’s testimony is 
never admissible. 
Curiously, a tractate similar to the one in Rosh Hashanah appears in 
Sanhedrin 3:3, with one main exception. The tractate in Sanhedrin lists 
the “gamblers,” “usurers,” “pigeon flyers,” and “sellers of sabbatical goods,” 
as people whose testimony is not admissible, but excludes the statement, 
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“This the general principle: all evidence that a woman is not eligible to give, 
these (people mentioned above) also are not eligible to bring.” According to 
Tzvi Karl, the ruling in Rosh Hashanah came after the one in Sanhedrin, 
which further supports the theory that as time went on, the rabbis limited 
women’s roles in the court. There could be many reasons for the opinions of 
the Tannaim to change over time, including external societal influences. For 
example, in Rome, many women were afforded more rights to participate in 
the public sphere, and in a reactionary fashion, the rabbis attempted to create 
laws limiting women to the home (Fuchs, 2012).1 However, Roman laws 
about women being witnesses are ambiguous, thus this cannot be the only 
reason for this shift. 
Why would tractate Rosh Hashanah mention women along with these 
groups of people? Among all of these categories, one thing that connects them 
is their supposed dishonesty. Perhaps women were seen as deceitful, which is 
why they cannot be trusted to testify in court. The conception of women as 
untrustworthy is one that runs throughout history in various societies. Since 
Eve, women have often been portrayed as crafty tricksters, fooling innocent 
men. Christian theology especially promulgated this idea, as it often portrayed 
women as seductive and deceiving. They based this conception partially on 
the Christian interpretation of the Adam and Eve story, in which Eve is the 
main deceiver in the story, not the snake. This idea even extended to the idea 
of women being witches, fooling men with their powers and lies. Perhaps the 
Jewish ban in the courts was a precursor to the Christian view, and simply 
reflected popular sentiment that women could not be trusted, along with 
gamblers and usurers. 
The change in the Mishnah indicates the following evolution: at one 
point, women were accepted as witnesses, indicated in Sanhedrin, then only 
in some situations, indicated in Rosh Hashanah, then not at all, as seen in 
Shevuot. Gradually, rabbinic decrees stripped women of the right to testify. 
This implies that this law was not originally from the Bible: if women were 
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prohibited from testifying in the bible, they would not be permitted to testify 
in particular situations in other legal texts. The weak proof using gezera shava 
(verbal analogy) and the non-direct examples from the Bible further support 
the idea that women were originally able to testify. Because the prohibition 
was made up with no sound Biblical basis, contemporary rabbis have the 
freedom to allow women to serve as witnesses. 
Amoraic Origins
Although Mishnaic sources sometimes allow women to give valid 
testimony, by the Amoraic period, women were categorically ineligible to 
testify. This follows the general trend we have observed, in which Tannaitic 
rabbis gradually restricted women’s testimony, so that by the time of the 
Amoraim, women were not allowed to testify at all. While the Amoraic 
sources depend on exegesis to prove that women cannot be witnesses, they do 
not provide any explanation as to why this ruling exists. 
In Bava Kamma 14b, a discussion of what is considered testimony leads 
to a conversation about women and minors as witnesses. The Talmud states, 
The Mishnah teaches Rabbi Yochanan Ben Broka, said: a woman 
or a minor is trustworthy when they say ‘from here this swarm of 
bees came.’ The stam asks: Are a woman and a minor eligible for 
testimony? Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: Here we are 
dealing with a case where the owners were pursuing the bees, and the 
woman and minor were conversing offhandedly and saying, ‘It was 
from here that this swarm emerged.’
This commentary implies that at one point in the Talmudic period, women 
were eligible to provide evidence, given they were not formally testifying. 
This development furthers the theory that as time passed, the rabbis in the 
Tannaitic period gradually restricted women from testifying. At first women 
were able to testify for some matters, then they were only considered credible 
for immediate situations, when they were not aware that they were testifying. 
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This immediacy prevented women from changing their minds and being 
pressured by external influences to lie during their testimony (Fuchs, 2012).2
This Gemara further continues a discussion of whether casual remarks are 
considered testimony, and in which situations they are. The overall consensus 
is that offhand remarks are not testimony, and that the case with a beehive 
represents an exception, rather than a rule. This further supports the idea 
that women are not credible witnesses, since offhand remarks are generally 
not considered testimony. This beehive case demonstrates how the Amoraim 
interpreted Rabbi Yochanan Ben Beroka’s statement to further limit women. 
In the Tannaitic time, this may have been interpreted to further include 
women’s testimony, but by the time of the Amoraim, the cases in which 
offhand testimony was accepted were minimized. Furthermore, the Amoraim 
established that women’s testimony was not formally accepted, and that casual 
remarks from a woman were only credible because she was not formally 
testifying. 
The stam, a group of unattributed authors in the amoraic time, further 
explains the previously mentioned mishnah (Shevuot 4:1) in Shevuot 30a with 
the following: 
How do we know? – Because the Rabbis taught: “And the two 
men shall stand,” the verse refers to witnesses – You say [it refers 
to] witnesses; but perhaps [it refers to] the litigants? When it 
says: “between whom the controversy is,” the litigants are already 
mentioned; hence, how do I explain “and the two men shall stand?” 
[Therefore,] the verse refers to witnesses. And if you wish to say 
[something to refute this deduction, I give you another]: Here it 
is said, “two,” and there it is said, “two”; just as there it refers to 
witnesses, so here it refers to witnesses. What is meant by: If you wish 
to say [something to refute the deduction]? – You might say, because 
the verse is not written: “and those between whom the controversy 
is,” the whole verse refers to the litigants, [therefore, I give the second 
     Series II Issue Number 1i  Fall 2018/5779   •    67
deduction:] here it is said: two, and there it is said: two; just as there it 
refers to witnesses, so here it refers to witnesses.
These Amoraic rabbis depend on exegesis though gezera shava to argue that 
verses from Deuteronomy imply that women are ineligible to be witnesses. 
Deuteronomy 19:17 states, “And the two men shall stand, between whom 
the controversy is, before the lord, before the priests, and the magistrates in 
authority at the time, and the magistrates shall make a thorough investigation. 
If the man who testified is a false witness…” First, the stam brings a proof 
to state that “the two men shall stand” refers to witnesses, not litigants, so 
women aren’t disqualified from litigation processes, only witnessing. The stam 
further proves that this is referring to witnesses by referring to Deuteronomy 
19:15, “A single witness may not validate against a person any guilt or blame 
for any offense that may be committed; a case can be valid only on the 
testimony of two witnesses or three witnesses [or more].” Since the first time 
the word “two” is mentioned, it is referring to witnesses, the second time 
the word is mentioned it is also referring to witnesses. Now that we have 
established that ‘the two men shall stand’ is in fact referring to witnesses, 
not litigants, the stam uses this to support the mishnah, ‘an oath of evidence 
applies to men but not to women’ (Shevuot 4:1). 
The key weakness in this argument is the assumption that the word 
anashim (men) refers to only men, excluding women. In the Hebrew 
language, the plural word for man, anashim, can refer to a group of men, but 
also refers to groups in which both men and women are present. The entire 
Talmudic proof crumbles when one interprets the word anashim as “people”. 
The verse in Deuteronomy “the two men shall stand” now reads, “the two 
people shall stand”, and the subsequent Talmudic discussion about whether 
these “standing men” refer to witnesses or litigants is rendered irrelevant. The 
Hebrew language does not contain a gender-neutral word for “people”, so it 
is often difficult to know when the bible is referring only to men, or to both 
men and women. This issue arises frequently in the Talmud, in contexts in 
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which other laws excluding women are derived from the word anashim. The 
use of one disputed word, anashim, to disqualify women from testifying, 
further supports the theory that this was a rabbinic, not a biblical enactment. 
Although some may use this proof to claim that this ban is a biblical 
commandment, the weak proof, combined with the ambiguous statements of 
earlier Tannaim, demonstrates that women were excluded as witnesses by the 
Amoraic period, but not necessarily during the biblical era.
Shevuot 30A continues with further proof of the stam’s argument:
Another [baraita] teaches: “And the two men shall stand”; the verse 
refers to witnesses. You say [it refers to] witnesses; but perhaps [it 
refers to] the litigants? You may retort: Do, then, men come to 
court, and do not women ever come to court? But if you wish to 
say [something to refute this deduction, I give you another]: Here 
it is said, “two,” and there it is said, “two”; just as there it refers to 
witnesses, so here it refers to witnesses. What is meant by: If you wish 
to say [something to refute this]? – You might say, it is not usual for a 
woman, because “all glorious is the King’s daughter within”, [therefore 
I give the second deduction:] here it is said, “two,” and there it is said, 
“two”; just as there it refers to witnesses, so here it refers to witnesses. 
Here the stam follows the earlier argument, reasoning that the “two men” are 
witnesses, not litigants. By close reading, we can see that this segment logically 
deduces in the opposite direction of the previous proof. This paragraph states 
that because the passage refers to men, it must be referring to witnesses, not 
litigants, since women can come to court as litigants. The circular reasoning 
in this gemara is now evident and further undermines the evidence that the 
stam brings. To recap: first the stam states that the verse “two men shall stand” 
refers to witnesses, and because of this masculine language, women cannot be 
witnesses. In the second proof, the stam reasons that since women cannot be 
witnesses, but can be litigants, the “two men shall stand” refers to witnesses, 
again dependent on the masculine language. This inconsistency demonstrates 
     Series II Issue Number 1i  Fall 2018/5779   •    69
that the arguments used to prevent women from giving testimony do not 
hold up under scrutiny, implying that the rabbis are offering false reasons for 
this ruling.
Shevuot 30a raises the concept of modesty into the ruling and suggests 
that women cannot testify because “all glorious is the King’s daughter within.” 
In this passage from psalms, the king is alluding to God and the daughters are 
the Israelite women. There is significant evidence that the rabbis viewed the 
home as a proper place for women, and so tried to limit their participation in 
public affairs. The rabbis justified this practice by claiming that it preserved 
a woman’s modesty, as in this example. However, women were still allowed 
to participate in other court proceedings as litigants, such as those relating to 
marriage. If women were already allowed to participate in litigation, why did 
the rabbis see testifying as an affront to modesty?
Perhaps women’s involvement with litigation was unavoidable, despite 
issues with modesty, since women could be brought to court as plaintiffs or 
defendants. This has biblical roots in the case of the sotah, where a woman is 
essentially tried for adultery. A woman could also bring a case to court if her 
husband refuses to give her a divorce, and generally cases in which women are 
litigants are those which involve family life. However, women were permitted 
to own property, thus civil cases involving property were unavoidable. Women 
were also not permitted to be judges, which further demonstrates that women 
were generally unwelcome in the court system, yet were permitted to act as 
litigants out of necessity. 
Bava Kamma 88a further discusses this issue, stating unequivocally that 
women and slaves cannot give testimony.
But again would you now also say that according to the rabbis, a slave 
would be eligible to give evidence, since it says, “And behold, if the 
witness be a false witness and hath testified falsely against his brother?” 
– Ulla replied: “Regarding evidence you can surely not argue this. For 
his disqualification from giving evidence can be learned by means of 
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an a fortiori from the law in the case of woman: for if woman, who 
is eligible to enter [by marriage] into the congregation [of Israel] is 
yet ineligible to give evidence, how much more must a slave who is 
not eligible to enter [by marriage] into the congregation [of Israel] be 
ineligible to give evidence?”
It is not surprising that Ulla, whose misogyny is evident in Berakhot 51B, 
would state that women are ineligible to testify without providing any proof. 
In Berakhot, Ulla refuses to send the cup of blessing to Yalta, despite a request 
from Rav Nachman. He argues that the source of the blessing is the man, 
and that women can only receive the blessing via men, thus only men should 
have the cup of blessing. In Bava Kamma, Ulla states that women cannot be 
witnesses, and since women are held in higher esteem than slaves, slaves also 
cannot give testimony. He does not bring proof for why women are ineligible 
to testify, rather he bases his argument on the premise that earlier rabbis had 
already provided reasons. The conversation then discusses the obligations of 
minors, slaves and women, and robbers, all of whom are disqualified from 
giving testimony. Women are often listed within these groups [excluding 
robbers], since they are not obligated to fulfill all commandments. The 
comparison of these groups can shed light on why women were actually 
ineligible to testify. 
The inclusion of robbers further supports the previous argument that 
women cannot testify due to untrustworthiness. While this in no way suggests 
women are prone to act criminally, it does suggest that women cannot be 
held to the same standard as men. Innumerable prejudices about women may 
contribute to this estimation, for example, the prejudiced stereotype that 
women are more easily swayed than men, and can be pressured to change 
their testimony. Due to their lack of education, women may not have been 
able to understand financial cases as well as men. However, women were 
allowed to act as litigants in financial cases, so it would be inconsistent to 
exclude them from testifying in financial cases due to claims of ignorance. 
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Perhaps women were perceived as more easily swayed, despite any 
amount of education. Kiddushin 80b discusses a Mishnah stating that a man 
may be not be secluded with two women, but a woman can be secluded with 
two men. The school of Eliyahu taught that this is because “women are light 
minded”, so they would be more likely to be seduced. The idea that women 
are “light minded” can be one reason the rabbis prohibited women from 
testifying. This description of women indicates that when testifying, they can 
be easily influenced by outside pressure, be it from their husbands or fathers. 
The “light mindedness” of women can also be interpreted as an aspersion on 
their intelligence, indicating that women are inherently intellectually inferior 
to men, thus would be incapable of providing sound testimony. This idea may 
also be the reason women could not be judges, since most women would be 
unable to impartially judge both sides, due to their lack of intellect. 
During the Talmudic era, the roles of women were largely limited to 
the home, and in order to preserve the status quo the rabbis attempted to 
keep women out of the courts. Gittin 46a states “a man who would want 
to disgrace his wife in court,” implying that even being involved in a court 
proceeding was an embarrassment for women. This disgrace could be because 
this instance was specifically referring to divorce, or it could be interpreted 
as a broad statement referring to all court cases. Either way, this commentary 
implies that women were only present in court if it was necessary, and if not, 
should be excluded. This idea is further supported by Talmudic statements 
which allow women to act as witnesses in the case in cases of female purity 
and identifying other women (Ketubot 72a, Yevamot 30b). When there is no 
other option, women can be involved in courts, but ideally, they should be 
excluded. 
Conclusion
The Talmudic sources seem to indicate that as time passed, the rabbis 
gradually prohibited women from acting as witnesses. This theory is 
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supported by the appearance of Deborah, a female judge and prophetess 
in the book of Judges. In Talmudic times, it was unthinkable for a woman 
to be a judge, yet in a previous era, people came to Deborah for advice and 
judgement. Although evidence about women in the Biblical Era is scant, it 
is possible that women were able to testify in certain cases, as recognized by 
some Tannaitic sources. By the Amoraic era, it was taken as a fact that women 
could not testify, and reasons were not usually given. Overall, there is evidence 
that the rabbis were interested in limiting the roles of women outside of the 
home, and used testimony to support this aim. The weak biblical proofs, 
combined with the trend of limiting women as time progressed, suggests that 
the rabbis formulated an opinion and then searched for biblical reasons to 
support it. 
Whether it be from modesty, distrust of women, or women lacking 
education, none of these reasons are relevant in our modern world to block 
women from testifying. Women are more educated than ever, have many 
public leadership positions, and are independent enough to form their own 
opinions without being pressured by men. The opinions of the Talmudic 
rabbis were largely based on the ancient society in which they lived, which is 
why they had such difficulty producing biblical proofs. Over time, women’s 
testimony became gradually more accepted in certain situations, particularly 
in the regions of Ashkenazi Jews. This issue today is especially relevant in 
Israel, where rabbinic courts have a strong influence in many civil issues, 
particularly marriage. Contemporary rabbis in rabbinic courts have allowed 
women’s testimony in particular cases, regarding women’s and domestic issues, 
but women are still not qualified to testify in general. 
This discussion frames the view of women in modern Orthodoxy 
today, and relates to many other issues of women and halakha. Numerous 
contemporary rabbis believe that there is biblical proof that women are 
ineligible to testify, and therefore even as times change, women’s status in this 
regard will not. This view leads to a certain permanence in the role of women, 
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and does not accept the idea that as times modernize, so should halakha. 
If modern rabbis were to reject the biblical proof offered here, and instead 
realize that the Talmudic decision made was more influenced by the Talmudic 
era societies than the actual Torah, they might be open to changes. However, 
since many Orthodox rabbis today view the word of the Talmud as eternal, 
their view on women may never evolve from this era.
Endnotes
1. Ilan Fuchs, “Women’s Testimony in Jewish Law: A Historical Survey,” Hebrew 
Union College Annual 82-83 (2012): 119-59. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.15650/
hebruniocollannu.82-83.119.
2. Ibid.
Deena is a sophomore from New York, majoring in Cognitive Science and 
Philosophy. She is not going to medical school after college and is a feminist, much 
to the dismay of her mother. She is interested in bioethics, neuroscience research, and 
has no clue about what she wants to do after college, so please do not ask. 
